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THE EFFECT OF GERMANY'S SOCIAL 
MARKET ECONOMY ON 
COMPETITIVENESS 
Garrett Carpenter 
Introduction 
The German social market economy, with 
its generous social benefits and corresponding 
high tax rates, is at a crossroads. As the world 
moves from the Industrial Age to the 
Information Age, flexibility and agility are the 
keys to success. The Information Age is char-
acterized by a high risk, entrepreneurial en vi-
ronment, where businesses must continually 
transform to compete in a dynamic market. 
The German economic model is characterized 
by low risk investment by banks and an inflex-
ible, centralized labor market. 
Lawrence and Schultz argue that Europe's 
slow growth of recent times is a result of the 
changed structure of growth. During the 1950s 
and 1960s, growth in Europe and, especially, 
Germany exceeded historical experience. This 
was the result of special circumstances, includ-
ing an abundant supply of workers and the influx 
of advanced U.S. technology. (Lawrence and 
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Schultz, p. 3) The supply of workers increased 
with the transition from agriculture to industry 
and from immigrants from neighboring coun-
tries in the east and south. The European coun-
tries were essentially in a technological catch-
up mode, where imports in U.S. technology led 
to rapid increases in productivity. 
During the 1970s, this situation began to 
change. Lawrence and Schultz document five 
factors that changed the structure of growth. 
First, labor relations deteriorated with the 
increase in labor militancy across the continent. 
Second, the first oil shock in 1973 interrupted 
the cheap energy source Europe was used to 
and hence increased costs. Third, exchange 
rates became adjustable, which had the effect 
of increasing European labor costs toward par-
ity with those of its competitors . Fourth, 
European countries could not rely on catching 
up with the U.S.; they were now on the frontier 
of technology and had to lead. Competitiveness 
on the frontier of technology depends on inno-
vation rather than the adoption of existing 
technology. Flexibility and risk taking are cru-
cial to technological innovation. During this 
time, Europe focused on medium-technology 
products and fared poorly in information indus-
tries and other high-tech sectors. Fifth, labor 
must be able to move within companies and 
across sectors of the economy. This realloca-
tion of labor and other factors of production is 
crucial to the success of new technology. In 
Germany and other European countries, limits 
on the firing of workers and rigid union con-
tracts limited the reallocation of labor and the 
growth prospects of new technologies. The 
U.S., according to Lawrence and Schultz, suc-
cessfully reallocated its labor force essentially 
through a reliance on the free market. 
(Lawrence and Schultz, p. 4) 
Lawrence and Schultz also place part of 
the blame for Europe's poor economic perfor-
mance on the excessive role of the state. 
Relatively minor regulatory objectives like safe-
ty on the job were expanded to ensure worker 
participation in the decisions of management 
and government oversight of plant closure and 
layoffs. As Lawrence and Schultz note: "Failing 
firms are bailed out by subsidies, nationaliza-
tion and trade protection. Failing workers are 
bailed out by employment subsidies, extensive 
unemployment and disability benefits and train-
ing programs." (Lawrence and Schultz, p. 7) 
Companies are reluctant to hire full-time work-
ers because of the limits on firing them and are 
reluctant to hire part-time workers because of 
distortions from social insurance costs. 
The slowdown in growth in the 1970s 
occurred not only in Europe, but also in the 
U.S. and Japan. Post-war growth was consis-
tently higher in Europe than in the U.S. , while 
unemployment was consistently lower in 
Europe. But since 1980, growth in the U.S. and 
Japan has been almost double that of Europe, 
while unemployment has been significantly 
lower in the U.S. and Japan. The main concern 
in Europe over competitiveness is in the high-
tech sector. Both the U.S. and Japan have much 
higher shares of world exports of high-tech 
goods than they do for goods as a whole, while 
Europe (and particularly Germany) still relies 
on traditional industries (medium technology) 
such as the automotive and chemical indus-
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tries. Few European firms are competitive in 
the microelectronics sector, while the U.S. dom-
inates the microprocessor sector, and Japan and 
other Pacific Rim countries dominate the mem-
ory chip sector. The U.S. also dominates the 
computer software sector. Europe 's biggest 
effort to challenge the high-tech dominance of 
the U.S. has been Airbus Industrie, a consor-
tium of European aerospace companies. 
Despite heavy governmental subsidies of Airbus, 
however, the U.S. retains its dominant share of 
the world aerospace market. (Krugman, p. 57) 
Eurosclerosis 
"Eurosclerosis" has been the term (coined 
by Herbert Giersch) used to describe the abysmal 
performance of most of the Western European 
economies in recent times. (Caldwell, p. G4) 
Caldwell describes the "symptoms" as "big gov-
ernment, onerous taxes, high labor costs, ... an 
overly generous welfare state, ... and double-digit 
unemployment. " (p. G4) There is no doubt 
Germany falls into this category. Government 
spending in Germany is approximately 50 per-
cent of GOP, compared to 33 percent in the U.S. 
This forces Germany to have the highest tax bur-
den among major industrialized countries. 
Labor costs in Germany are also the highest in · 
the world. One out of every three marks spent 
by the German government is spent on social 
programs. The unemployment rate in Germany 
now exceeds 11 percent (February, 1996). As a 
result of these factors, Germany and the rest of 
Western Europe had practically no net gain in 
private sector employment during the 1980s 
compared to the 19 million net new jobs in the 
United States during the same period. Assar 
Lindbeck, a Professor of Inte rnational 
Economics at the University of Sweden, attrib-
utes the better performance of the American 
economy to "the ability not only to absorb an 
increasing labor force but also to recover from 
recessions and to shift resources -labor as well 
as capital - to expanding industries. " 
(Lindbeck, p. 158) The German Research 
Minister, Paul Krueger, says, "People are no 
longer prepared to bear risks in Germany. They 
didn't have to for a long time because there has 
been really great prosperity. We're talking about 
a society that is sated." (Benjamin, p. A1) 
According to Lindbeck, it is the "long-
term gradual deterioration in the functioning 
of some basic mechanisms" of the West 
European economies that is to blame for their 
weak performance. This has been caused by 
two factors. First, there is the inability of both 
real and relative wage rates to equilibrate vari-
ous parts of the labor market and to adjust to 
new circumstances. The second factor is the 
increased costs and inflexibilities in the labor 
markets due to higher (and highly-distorting) 
taxes and the increased regulation of employ-
ment. (Lindbeck, p. 155) Taxes increased as a 
result of the rapid increase in public spending 
combined with the attempted redistribution of 
income. And when abrupt changes in relative 
costs, like the oil shocks in the 1970s, and inter-
national competition required rapid realloca-
tion of resources, the rigidities started to 
become a severe disadvantage to the West 
European countries. 
The high unemployment rates in 
Germany are compounded by the fact that a 
large proportion of German jobless are consid-
ered long-term unemployed. OECD (Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment) numbers show that of all of Germany's 
unemployed, one out of three have been out of 
work for at least a year compared to only one 
out of ten in the United States. (Schlaes, "A 
Germany That Kills Science," p. A22) In the 
U.S. unemployment "rotates" among a larger 
fraction of the labor force than in Europe. This 
rotating unemployment affects more people 
and keeps down the rate of increase in nominal 
wages because more people are aware of the 
risks of unemployment. (Lindbeck, p. 158) 
There have been four main theories that 
have been suggested to explain the long-term 
unemployment problem in Germany and the 
rest of western Europe: a Keynesian demand 
gap, a neoclassical wage gap, a hysteretic labor 
market, and structural rigidities. (Giersch, 
p. 196) The Keynesian demand gap theory states 
that a lack of aggregate demand is the main 
explanation for West German unemployment. 
This lack of demand is the result of contrac-
tionary policy shifts: a strong anti-inflationary 
monetary policy and a deficit-reduction fiscal 
policy. This theory, however, fails to provide 
reasons for the fact that even in times of strong 
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economic growth, long-term unemployment 
persists in most of western Europe. The neo-
classical wage gap theory suggests that unit 
labor costs have been too high for full employ-
ment to be reached. Giersch, however, argues 
that the neoclassical wage gap is not the cause 
of the increase in unemployment, but may be 
detrimental to attempts to decrease unemploy-
ment. The hysteretic labor market theory was 
first presented in the 1980s to explain the long-
term unemployment problem in Europe. It 
suggests that after long recessions, a dual labor 
market develops with two kinds of workers: 
those who remain unemployed and those who 
are jobless for only a short time. The long-term 
unemployed have trouble re-entering the work-
force due to a lack of work experience, a lack of 
motivation, or demoralization. Finally, Giersch, 
Paque and Schmieding argue that structural 
rigidities are the primary reason for the long-
term unemployment problem. These rigidities 
can't explain sudden increases in unemploy-
ment, which they attribute to cyclical forces, 
but can help explain the phenomenon of long-
term unemployment. Some of these rigidities 
are high labor costs, high taxes, large social 
costs, a regulatory burden, and an inflexible 
workforce. (Giersch, pp. 202-203) 
Structural Rigidities 
Labor Costs and Rigidities 
One of the structural rigidities of the 
German economy concerns the German labor 
market. The German worker's wages are 
among the highest in the world today. This is 
part of the reason why unit labor costs are 40 
percent higher in Germany than in the United 
States and Japan. These high costs are forcing 
some of Germany's "bread and butter" indus-
tries to move production and investment else-
where. For example, the German Auto Industry 
Federation has predicted that one-third of 
German car production will be shifted abroad 
by the year 2000. (Gallagher) There are other 
factors besides costs that come into play, but 
nevertheless this is a troubling trend for one of 
the staples of German industry. The German 
chemical industry, another of Germany's core 
industries, is also following this trend. The 
chairman of Bayer, Manfred Schneider, has said 
that more production will be exported to the 
dynamic Pacific Rim market and to the United 
States. (Gallagher) 
Once heralded for the labor peace it 
insured, Germany's centralized bargaining sys-
tem now appears too rigid. Under this system 
unions negotiate on an industry level instead of 
with individual companies. The unions also 
elect workers ' councils where they have a say 
in management decisions, including dismissals. 
This system has been very successful over the 
years. During the 1960s and 1970s when wages 
in the United States were skyrocketing, wage 
increases in Germany were much closer to pro-
ductivity increases, thus keeping inflation 
down. Now, with larger companies dominating 
the industry groups, some small companies see 
the system as a major problem. Because the 
main incentive for larger companies is to insure 
labor peace and keep their operations from 
shutting down, they have not been taking the 
hard line with the unions that the smaller com-
panies want. Smaller companies don't have the 
ability to absorb these large labor cost increas-
es, and the centralized system doesn't make any 
provisions for them. This is leading many of 
the smaller companies to challenge the status 
quo by quitting the industry groups and nego-
tiating on their own. 
The centralized bargaining system has 
also led to a compression of pay differentials 
across sectors and among differently skilled 
workers. These compressed pay differentials 
don't reflect productivity differences. If there 
is not a large difference between the income of 
a highly skilled worker (such as a doctor) and a 
low skilled worker (such as a machinist), the 
incentives to obtain advanced skills will be 
diminished. Also, an increase in the wages of 
low skilled laborers leads to a decrease in 
employment for these same workers. This leads 
in turn to an inflexible labor market where 
wages are not greatly affected by changes in 
demand for and supply of labor. 
One cause of high labor costs is the 
strength of German unions. They have been 
able to increase their pay, while at the same 
time decreasing their workweek. The recent 
agreement between the IG Metall Union and 
Gesamt Metall Employers Association (March 
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7, 1995) is a prime example. Even with the 
unemployment rate near 10 percent in 
Germany, the union was still able to wring a 
generous two-year deal from the employers. 
The union received a 4 percent rise in nominal 
wages in the first year of the deal and no 
increase in the second. The workweek for these 
workers was cut to 35 hours from 36 hours. 
This cut in hours leads to high overtime costs 
in times of increased demand. This labor 
agreement does not appear to be overly gener-
ous, but the chief economist at Goldman, Sachs 
& Co. in Frankfurt, Thomas Mayer, predicted 
wage costs would increase at more than twice 
the rate of inflation as a result of the deal. 
(Templeman, p. 60) This settlement also led to 
similar settlements in other sectors, including 
chemicals and insurance, and is a bad omen for 
German industry. 
The argument for labor flexibility in this 
era of rapid technological advancement rests on 
the need for resources to be allocated to indus-
tries of strong potential growth and away from 
declining industries. The German collective 
bargaining system, along with governmental 
restrictions on the firing of labor, restricts the 
normal allocational mechanisms of the labor 
market, leading employers to be reluctant to 
hire more labor. There are two types of restric-
tions on labor mobility: restrictions on labor 
turnover such as employment protection laws, 
and distortions of the wage structure (e.g., com-
. pression of pay differentials) so that relative 
wages no longer provide an accurate signal of 
where labor resources are valued most. 
(Flanagan, p. 188) In Europe, legislation and 
collective bargaining long ago dismissed the 
possibility that a worker could be let go at the 
will of the employer. In Germany, employers 
must show that adjustment methods that would 
avoid layoffs (e.g., short-time work and retrain-
ing) have been attempted before dismissals can 
be approved. Lack of profitability is not, in 
itself, a sufficient justification; authorities must 
be convinced that dismissals are a last resort. 
(Flanagan, p. 194) 
High Taxes 
Taxes in Germany currently amount to 44 
percent of GOP compared to 31 percent in the 
United States. The troubling fact is that recent 
trends in Germany have led to higher and high-
er taxes. Since reunification there have been 
implemented a special reunification tax, an 
energy tax, an insurance tax, an automobile tax, 
a tobacco tax, a second insurance tax, an 
increase in the value-added tax, a tax on inter-
est, a third insurance tax, a second energy tax, 
and a second tax on personal vehicles. These 
taxes were all initiated with the allegedly "con-
servative" Helmut Kohl administration in 
power. The effect of these tax increases is an 
increase in the cost of doing business in 
Germany and a decrease in the competitiveness 
of Germany internationally. 
The top income tax rate, for those who 
make $80,000 or more, is already above 50 per-
cent. These high personal tax rates have led the 
famous German tennis superstar, Boris Becker, 
to abandon his native country in search of tax 
relief in Monaco. Steffi Graf, another famous 
tennis star, has recently been under investiga-
tion for tax evasion. Another result of these 
high rates is the decreased incentive to take 
risks and start new businesses. The lesson 
learned in the United States during the 1980s 
was that a decrease in the marginal tax rates led 
to exceptional growth. This was a result of the 
increased incentives to take risks and invest 
capital with the knowledge that individuals 
would be able to keep more of what they earned. 
The corporate tax rate in Germany is the 
highest of any OECD country, with a 58.95 per-
cent rate at the top of the scale. (Bartlett, p. 
A18) This is another burden on Germany's busi-
nesses and probably forces them to lower their 
levels of employment. 
Social Costs 
There are three main types of obligatory 
social security programs in Germany: a pension 
plan, health insurance, and unemployment 
insurance. The contributions for the three pro-
grams are split evenly between employers and 
employees. According to the Confederation of 
German Employers' Association, social contri-
butions paid by the employer (on top of wage 
costs) were 84 percent of direct wage costs in 
1993, compared to 77 percent in 1987 and 50 
percent in 1970. In 1993, German direct wages 
27 
ranked fifth highest in the world, but when 
social costs were figured in, Germany topped 
the list in labor costs. (Confederation of 
German Employers' Association, p. 3) With the 
steady aging of the German population and the 
shrinking of the working population, the social 
security system is in need of serious reform. 
The problem is similar to that of the United 
States and the "Baby Boomers." The addition 
of 17 million new claims from the former East 
Germany, without a large increase in contribu-
tions, has made the situation even worse. The 
social security contribution rates have risen 
from 26.5 percent of gross income in 1970 to 
39.1 percent in 1994. (Peel, p. XI) 
Germany has two separate unemployment 
programs: Arbeitslosengeld and Arbeitslosen-
hilfe. Arbeitslosengeld is unemployment insur-
ance for experienced unemployed workers. It 
is not subject to a means test and is financed 
through a payroll tax on both employers and 
workers. A worker is eligible for insurance if 
he or she has satisfied contribution require-
ments. The duration of benefits received by the 
worker is linked to the duration of contribu-
tions from the worker. Arbeitslosenhilfe is 
unemployment assistance mainly for those who 
have exhausted their insurance. It is means 
tested and financed out of general revenues. 
The assistance is determined as a percentage of 
a worker's wages minus income tax and social 
security contributions. The assistance require-
ments are more lenient than those of unem-
ployment insurance despite being means test-
ed. There is no time limit for such assistance. 
(Burtless, pp. 127 -28) 
Burtless documents four main effects of 
generous unemployment benefits on unem-
ployment. First, the benefit can lengthen the 
average duration of unemployment by reduc-
ing the incentive for unemployed workers to 
accept new jobs. This phenomenon in turn 
depends on such matters as eligibility, gen-
erosity, duration, and regulation. If eligibility 
criteria are strict, the aggregate effect on 
unemployment is small. If weekly benefits are 
high compared with typical earnings in employ-
ment, the cost of unemployment to the unem-
ployed will be low and the incentive to find a 
job will also be small. Payments that continue 
for a lengthy period of time also place less pres-
sure on the jobless worker to find a job than 
payments that last for a shorter period of time. 
Also the effort made by authorities to make sure 
that the jobless make reasonable efforts to find 
and accept suitable jobs is significant. 
The second of the four effects mentioned 
by Burtless is that generous unemployment 
insurance can increase the probability that 
workers enter unemployment by quitting jobs 
because of the assurance of unemployment ben-
efits. Workers might even be less inclined to 
perform to the best of their ability, leading to 
dismissals. Burtless argues that jobless bene-
fits can also affect unemployment by raising the 
equilibrium real wage. Trade unions, for exam-
ple, might use the reliability of unemployment 
insurance to take more aggressive stances in 
wage negotiations. The fourth effect Burtless 
notes is that payroll taxes to pay for unemploy-
ment insurance increase the employment costs 
borne by employers. The greater the benefits 
of unemployment insurance, the higher the 
payroll taxes. This increases the cost of hiring 
workers and leads to a decreased demand for 
labor. (Burtless, p. 108) 
The "replacement ratio" is a concept for 
measuring the microeconomic work incentives 
to workers. It is the ratio of net benefits 
received in unemployment to the net earnings 
received at work. The U.S . has replacement 
ratios that are much less than those in 
Germany and in the rest of Europe. The aver-
age weekly benefit level in the U.S. is not much 
less than in Germany, but the benefits last half 
as long, leading to the lower replacement ratio. 
(Burtless, p. 114) This could be a contributing 
factor to the greater long-term unemployment 
problem that Germany has compared to that of 
the United States. 
Regulatory Burdens 
Barriers to market entry in certain fields 
and government subsidies have been impedi-
ments to competition in German industry. 
Monopolies set up by the government are bar-
riers to competition and dominate the market 
in such fields as telecommunications, utilities, 
and transportation. In the electricity sector, 
government regulations and monopolies have 
greatly increased electricity costs; the result is 
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that costs are 70 percent higher in Germany 
than in the U.S. (Steinmetz, p. AS) These high-
er costs hurt the competitiveness of German 
industry. The effect of keeping the telecommu-
nications monopoly, Deutsche Telekom, has 
been higher costs for consumers. Local phone 
charges are twice as high in Germany as in the 
U.S. (Fuhrman, p. 99) An example of the bur-
den of regulation on German business is the 
time needed to get permission to build a new 
chemical plant. It took 6 months in 1985; it 
now takes 18 months. (Shlaes , "A Germany 
That Kills Science," p. A22) 
Subsidies have the effect not only of keep-
ing taxes high, but also of propping up ineffi-
cient industries. This is, in effect, corporate 
welfare with special interests lobbying the gov-
ernment for help instead of cutting costs and 
competing. These subsidies are mainly in the 
shipbuilding, steel, agriculture, and mining 
industries. An argument might be made to pro-
tect the shipbuilding industry for national secu-
rity, but the other subsidies are just a form of 
protectionism and wind up costing the con-
sumer/taxpayer more than they help the spe-
cific industry. Government subsidies, such as 
to the coal industry, amount to between 4-5 
percent of GOP. (Bibbee, p. 35) The German 
government spends more on protecting these 
old Industrial Age industries than to support 
basic research. 
The retail industry in Germany provides a 
good example of government overregulation. 
Laws prohibit stores from marking down the 
price of merchandise unless it was done simul-
taneously with other stores, which would defeat 
the purpose. This restriction is nothing but a 
stifling of competition among stores and is 
quite detrimental to consumers because there 
is an incentive for shopkeepers to keep prices 
high. Other laws mandate that all stores (with 
a few exceptions at tourist attractions) be closed 
on Sundays and three Saturdays a month and 
limit the hours that the store can be open dur-
ing the week. In defense of these laws a trade 
union official was quoted as saying, "The right 
of 2.7 million retail employees to go home at 
the weeknight closing time of 6:30 p.m. clear-
ly outweighs the desire of a few individuals to 
shop in the evening. " (Shlaes, "Germany 's 
Chained Economy," p. 119) This represents a 
serious attack on the rights of consumers to 
shop when most convenient and probably is one 
cause of the low level of consumer spending in 
Germany. The evenings and weekends are the 
most opportune times to shop because most 
workers are off from work. Pressure to dereg-
ulate the retail industry, however, has been met 
with resistance. As Ulf Kalkman, co-chairman 
of the Retail Trade Association of Hamburg, 
remarks, "We'd love to leave everything as it is." 
(Burke, p. 8) 
Other regulations, such as those on 
biotechnology, probably have more serious 
effects. Environmental regulations and public 
opposition to local plants have dealt a serious 
blow to the German biotechnology industry. 
The success of the Green party in recent times 
is indicative of the environmental mindset of 
the German people. In 1982, HoechstA.G., one 
of Germany's largest chemical and pharmaceu-
tical companies, invested $38 million in a plant 
to produce human insulin but was forced to 
close because of political and public opposition. 
(Greens) At the same time, Eli Lilly of the 
United States developed the same chemical and 
exported to Germany what just as easily could 
have been produced there. As a result, Germany 
lags 5-8 years behind the United States in this 
key Information Age technology. Also, opposi-
tion from home has led many German chemi-
cal companies to move biotech research to 
neighboring France and close to the leading 
research universities in the United States. The 
opposition to the biotechnology industry is 
partly due to the public impression that the 
research resembles some of the genetic 
research done by Hitler earlier this century. It 
is also due to scare tactics and disinformation 
by radical environmentalists and ignorance on 
the part of the public. In reality, genetic engi-
neering is a substitution for chemicals, such as 
herbicides and pesticides, that environmental-
ists despise. A genetically altered gene is 
immune to certain diseases and insects that 
previously forced farmers to use chemicals. 
(Shlaes, "A Germany That Kills Science," p. 
A22) The head of the molecular biology section 
at Schering A. G. (a Berlin-based pharmaceuti-
cal company) , Dr. Wolf-Dieter Schleuning, 
laments, "If you say in America you're in genet-
ic engineering, it's glamorous. People admire 
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you. Say it in Germany, and people suspect 
you." (Benjamin, p. A1) 
The opposition to biotechnology may be 
indicative of a bigger probl~m for Germany: an 
increasing hostility to technological and scien-
tific change. There is even a German term for 
this phenomenon, Technologiefeindlichkleit, or 
"hostility to technology." Public opinion polls 
show that Germans are less open to new tech-
nologies than Japanese or Americans. Jochen 
Hansen of the Allensbach Institute remarks, 
"Today, you can express the feeling in public-
'I don 't like technology' -without any rea-
soning. On television, you can always expect 
applause." (Benjamin, p. A1) This represents 
serious trouble for the country that led the 
world in technological advancement during the 
Industrial Age. A public hostile to technology 
will probably not be open to the increasing role 
of computers in people's lives and the efficien-
cies that come along with them. The com put-
er software industry supports millions of jobs 
in the United States and is dominated by tech-
no-wizards and computer hawks. Personal 
computer penetration in the U.S. is more than 
twice as great as in Germany. As of 1993, 28 
percent of homes in the U.S. had personal com-
puters, while only 12 percent of homes in 
Germany had them. (Fuhrman, p. 99) How can 
a German child who has never used a comput-
er one day compete with an American child who 
grew up with computers? In this time of dizzy-
ing change and increasing global competition, 
technological leadership is the key to success. 
lnnovationskrise 
The lnnovationskrise, or innovation cri-
sis, has also been cited as another cause of the 
perceived decline in German competitiveness. 
Germany lags behind the United States and 
Japan in declaration of patents in high-tech 
industries. A report by Chancellor Kohl in late 
1994 said that in microelectronics the number 
of German patents decreased by 40 percent 
between 1987 and 1992, while they doubled in 
the U.S. and increased by 30 percent in Japan. 
The Chancellor also saw similar trouble in com-
puters and communications. (Shlaes, 
"Germany's Chained Economy," p. 121) One 
cause may be German regulation. For exam-
ple, in the area of biotechnology, German com-
panies must go through a lengthy process just 
to get approval to conduct an experiment, while 
in the United States, the only approval needed 
is for the final product. Wilfred Prewo of the 
Hanover Chamber of Commerce complains: 
"The Americans invent, the Japanese produce, 
while the Germans still debate ethics." (Shlaes, 
"Germany 's Chained Economy," p. 122) 
Another cause of the Innovationskrise might be 
the lack of a large venture capital market, which 
limits German entrepreneurship and prevents 
many start-up companies from being success-
ful. The primary sources of funds for German 
companies are large banks. These banks tend 
to be conservative investors and prefer financ-
ing refinements to old technology rather than 
completely new ideas. These banks are also 
major stockholders in German companies and, 
by being too conservative, may hamper the abil-
ity of these companies to innovate. 
Reunification and the Political 
Situation 
Reunification of East and West Germany 
was a great event for the people of Germany and 
a political triumph for the Kohl administration. 
However, the economic consequences are cost-
ly. There were two main mistakes made during 
the reunification process. First, there was an 
original inflated appraisal of the value of East 
German physical assets, which was compound-
ed by stubborn reliance on that assessment 
when confronted by evidence to the contrary. 
During the Cold War, the East German econo-
my was thought to be the strongest of the 
Soviet Bloc countries. However, during reuni-
fication the West German government would 
have been better off with a mindset of having 
to rebuild the East German economy from 
scratch. The second mistake was the extension 
of all West German law and regulation to the 
East. This included setting an exchange rate of 
two East German marks for one Deutsche 
mark, despite estimates that a more reasonable 
exchange rate was five East German marks for 
one deutsche mark. West Germany has enough 
trouble with its overtaxed and overregulated 
economic system, but productivity in the East 
was much lower than in the West at the time of 
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reunification and remains so today. Instead of 
transferring the West German economic sys-
tem to the East, one possible alternative would 
have been to use the East as a laboratory to pro-
mote reforms needed in the West, such as a low-
tax and low-regulatory environment. A com-
parison between the former East Germany and 
the Czech Republic since the fall of the Iron 
Curtain is striking. Although East Germany 
was supposedly the most advanced of the for-
mer Soviet Bloc countries, the unemployment 
rate today in the East is about 17 percent com-
pared to only 3.5 percent in the Czech Republic. 
The difference is that East Germany imported 
an overtaxed, overregulated and high-wage 
model with corresponding low productivity, 
while the Czech Republic started from scratch 
and essentially let the market determine its 
wage levels. As a result of Germany's policy, 
unit labor costs in the East are actually 40 per-
cent higher than in the West. 
The present Chancellor of Germany, 
Helmut Kohl , has stressed the need for 
increased competitiveness, but with the recent 
gains by the Social Democrats (SDP) and the 
Greens in the last election (1994) , the outlook 
doesn 't look too optimistic. Also a troubling 
omen for reformers was the poor showing by 
the Free Democrats (FDP) , the only real free-
market -oriented political party in Germany and 
the coalition partner of Kohl 's Christian 
Democrats. Although Kohl stayed in power, his 
majority in the Bundestag has only a narrow 10 
seat margin. Since World War II, the FDP has 
been a part of almost every government coali-
tion. Businesses should worry about the 
strength of a possible Red-Green coalition 
between the SDP and the Greens. While the 
Kohl government at least recognizes the costs 
of excessive regulation and high taxes, the SDP 
and Greens favor increasing the influence of the 
state over the economy. 
Conclusion 
An entitlement mindset has come to infect 
Germany, the rest of Western Europe, and even 
the United States. President John F. Kennedy's 
famous line, "Ask not what your country can do 
for you, but what you can do for your country," 
doesn 't seem to fit the reality of the western 
world anymore. People don't seem to be will-
ing to sacrifice anymore, whether it is social 
security payments or health care payments. 
This is the result of the growth of the influence 
of government over peoples' lives. Government 
guarantees are disincentives for the essential 
aspects of a free market: risk-taking and entre-
preneurship. With the dramatic redistribution 
of wealth from the successful to the unsuc-
cessful that characterizes the social market 
economies, incentives are taken away from 
those with capital to work hard, risk their hard-
earned capital and create jobs with new and 
innovative businesses. Most of the substantial 
job creation that occurred during the Reagan 
years was accomplished not by large corpora-
tions, but by small businesses. This trend will 
become even more pronounced in the 
Information Age because of the need for agili-
ty and flexibility to compete. 
The German government recently 
(January 1996) announced plans to scale back 
its welfare system and lower taxes on business 
and individuals. Chancellor Kohl 's coalition 
launched a "50-point plan" in order to support 
entrepreneurial start-ups, cut social welfare 
spending, and lower taxes. The plan followed 
talks between business, unions and the gov-
ernment on job creation and economic reha-
bilitation, and is designed to stimulate growth, 
investment and job-creation. It includes spe-
cific measures to help start-up companies, 
including a lower tax burden, improved access 
to venture capital, and fewer legal hurdles for 
small- and medium-sized start-up companies. 
The plan includes simpler review procedures 
for planning and approval of new production 
facilities. Specific fiscal and tax policy plans 
include reducing the government share of GDP 
31 
to 46 percent by the year 2000, lowering or 
eliminating local taxes on capital and profits 
and reducing the solidarity surcharge tax. 
Spending cuts are also proposed to reduce 
social security contributions by firms and 
employees to under 40 percent of income lev-
els. Privatization of certain state-owned indus-
tries will be reinforced, and deregulation of the 
energy and information sectors will be pro-
posed. The plan also calls for reform of the 
above-mentioned retail shop-hour laws. (Reuter 
European Business Report) Kohl 's plan shows 
a realization by the government of the problems 
Germany faces and, if adopted, will be a step in 
the right direction. An obstacle to the adoption 
of the plan is the opposition party, the SDP. The 
SDP controls the Bundesrat, the upper house 
in parliament, and will have a big role in any 
new legislation. 
Germany is a great nation, and it has over-
come many great challenges in the past. 
However, there is now a strong public opposi-
tion toward technological change. German 
politicians and business leaders must convince 
the people that it is in their best interest to 
adapt to the changing environment and new 
technology. If Germany makes some structur-
al changes which would allow companies to bet-
ter compete in the global market, Germany can 
reverse its competitive decline and regain its 
historic technological leadership role. But if 
the German government doesn't make changes 
to free the entrepreneurial spirit of its citizens, 
the German economy will find it increasingly 
difficult to compete with the United States and 
other major countries. The likely result in 
Germany would be lower rates of growth and a 
slower increase in living standards. 
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